By Ntoh Michael Makia
So much has been said about Xi Jinping’s 20-22 March visit to Russia. Most of the descriptive genres have already been exhausted by scholars and journalists versed in geo-politics. In detailing specific aspects of the summit, and giving deep socio-cultural analyses of the activities that sprang from the meeting in Moscow, most concerned readers around the world got lost in the theses and analyses put forward by media houses.
For record’s sake, we are sharing brief answers to the most frequently asked questions just to clarify what happened in Moscow during the Chinese leader’s visit and move on.
Is Russia and China allies?
Both countries have limited experience with alliances and are not really inclined towards this form of relationship. Their union implies obligations and, most importantly, the limitation of one’s own interests and capabilities in favor of another state. If this is mutual, then it is normal and can be mutually beneficial, but the dominant setting in both Chinese and Russian political logic is freedom of action and the maximum degree of sovereignty.
Therefore, both Moscow and Beijing shy away from calling their ties an alliance, finding more ornate formulations. This is what happened this time as well. However, it is worth emphasizing that the expressions used by the Leader of the People’s Republic of China, perhaps, as close as possible (as far as it is possible for Chinese culture) lead to the concept of an alliance, without naming it.
Is this relationship an equal relationship?
The issue of equality is largely conditional. It is not clear how to measure its degree. There is no formal hierarchy in relations between Russia and China, and in principle it cannot exist. Features are difficult to compare. China, of course, is much more powerful in the economic sense, and now in many technological parameters. Russia is a significant military and political force. In terms of such a parameter as readiness for adverse changes and shocks (a kind of state endurance), Russia is perhaps in the lead, but now China has clearly more room for maneuver in world politics.
Why is China and Russia in no hurry to launch the largest gas project?
This question can be put differently: who needs whom more and who, accordingly, should make more efforts to strengthen their ties? At first glance, Russia now needs China more but with a sharp conflict of interest with the group of the most successful and influential states in the world, China is significantly limiting the possibilities. Russia’s needs must be compensated by other equally significant partners who, for some reason, can put forward conditions. All in all, the most significant tango partner for Russia is China.
This is true, “but there is another side,” says Professor Fedor Lukyanov, Research Fellow at Higher School of Economics (HSE) Russia. “China has finally realized that the time of peace and comfort for development is over. It is China that is perceived by the United States as its main opponent for decades to come. The pressure on China will only increase with time. Beijing has no partner more solid and reliable than Moscow,” Lukyanov continues. There are simply no other candidates. And the importance of having such a partnership will continue to grow. Traditional Chinese pragmatism works in Russia’s favor here.
Does China support Russia over Ukraine?
The Ukrainian crisis is a complex phenomenon with several dimensions. China’s position on various aspects may vary. As far as the actual conflict between Moscow and Kiev is concerned, Beijing’s position is distilledly restrained. China does not consider it its obligation and something in its interest to interfere in this conflict, limiting itself to calls for peace and observance of common norms. The complexity of Russia’s claims to Ukraine, which has accumulated in specific historical circumstances, is not close to China; it is none of its business.
However, there is an aspect connected with the relations between Russia and the West, and consequently, with the state of the world hierarchy and the prospects for the world order. Here, China is much more active. It takes positions very close to Russia’s and opposite to the West’s. Perhaps the main thing is that China is extremely uninterested in the success of western involvement in Ukraine, which would mean a significant weakening of Russia.
Therefore, China will, of course, behave carefully, constantly emphasizing the need and no alternative to cessation of hostilities, but will not put pressure on Russia or take any actions that complicate Russia’s situation. On the contrary, Russia expects a gradual increase in assistance.
“Our countries need a different construction of the world,” says Professor Alexey Maslov, commenting on how Russia and China approach the idea of uniting the countries of the non-Western core.
Will there be an economic breakthrough or will the Sino-Russian economic ties continue to be the weakest link in their relationship?
The western-centric nature of Russia’s foreign economic relations is a longstanding and complex problem. The current crisis, when these ties began to be abruptly cut off at the initiative of the West, to some extent makes the task easier and leaves no options. Nevertheless, the restructuring of the Russian economy will be painful and will take time to build infrastructures. The emerging political will of western states to try to put Russia in a corner is stimulating the process of reformatting the Russian economy and hence change in Russia.
China is a global economic superpower; its interests and needs extend almost everywhere. By stepping up relations with Russia, which is now at a disadvantage in terms of external pressure, Beijing will carefully consider the risks to itself. No one will fully rush into a head on collision for the sake of Russia.
However, Xi Jinping’s visit was extremely important as a signal from the Chinese Communist Party and the State to all businesses, that they need to work and look for options. In China, such signals are heard. Russia’s task, for its part, is to help this process in every possible way.
The author, a Cameroonian living and working in Russia for about three decades, is Director of Studies, I.L. Academy St Petersburg.